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EVIDENCE LAW-Striking the Right Balance in New
Mexico's Rape Shield Law-State v. Johnson
I. INTRODUCTION
A prostitute can be the victim of rape. What right, however, does a defendant in
a rape prosecution have to introduce extrinsic evidence that his alleged victim had
acted as a prostitute on prior occasions? In State v. Johnson,' the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that evidence that the rape victims- were prostitutes was
inadmissible because the defendant failed to show the relevance of such evidence.2
Under the New Mexico rape shield law 3 and its corresponding rule of evidence,4 the
admissibility of evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct is judicially determined
in camera at a pretrial hearing based on the traditional balancing test: whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.' The Johnson
decision is significant because it addressed the protection afforded rape victims
under the statute and provided guidelines for the trial court when determining the
admissibility of evidence of the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct. The
guidelines reflect the policy behind the enactment of the New Mexico rape shield
law as well as the constitutional limits on that protection. This Note examines the
historical background of rape shield laws, the Johnson court's rationale, and the
implications of the decision on a trial court's discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence of past sexual conduct.
6
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Richard Leonard Johnson (defendant) was accused of rape arising out of several
incidents on Central Avenue in Albuquerque.7 The State alleged that in each case
the defendant enticed a woman into his car by telling her he was a police officer,
then drove her to a secluded area, and allegedly assaulted and raped her at
knifepoint 8 The defendant argued that the alleged victims were prostitutes who had
engaged in consensual sex with him and then falsely accused him of rape because
he refused to pay them.9
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine pursuant to Section 30-916(C) of the New Mexico Statutes seeking to introduce evidence of the victims'
prior sexual conduct. He specifically wanted to "question the women concerning
their experiences with prostitution and to introduce extrinsic evidence.., tending
to prove they were prostitutes."' In the defendant's motion in limine submitted to
the trial court, the defendant stated that he "has reason to believe that the alleged

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

123 N.M. 640,944 P.2d 869 (1997).
See id. at 642, 944 P.2d at 871.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
See N.M. R. EviD. Rule 11-413.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16(A).
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are paraphrased from Johnson, 123 N.M. at 642-43, 944 P.2d at 871-

72.
7. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 1, State v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 77, 79, 908 P.2d 770, 772
(Ct. App. 1995) (No. 15,710), rev'd, 123 N.M. 640,944 P.2d 869 (1997).
8. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 1, Johnson (No. 15,710).
9. See id. at 3.
10. State v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 77,79,908 P.2d 770,772 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d
869 (1997).
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victims in this matter had engaged in sexual conduct prior to the incidents alleged
in the indictment, which conduct is material and essential to the defense against
those charges.. . ."" The State filed an opposing motion to exclude any reference
to the victim's sexual conduct "with any person other than the defendant" and "to
any alleged illicit sexual activity performed by any victim in this case."' 12 During an
in camera hearing, the trial court heard testimony that each of the victims
previously had engaged in acts of prostitution." The trial court asked the defendant
why he believed the evidence should be admitted. Defense counsel replied:
The evidence which we would seek to elicit by questioning first the women
themselves and then from other witnesses, as well, is the fact that at least two
of the women-one woman is known to the police as a prostitute and, in fact,
been arrested as a prostitute. Another woman admitted to the detective
investigating the case that she had engaged in prostitution at the time this
occurred, was in the habit of, if not gaining her income, at least supplementing
it by prostitution. That is essentially the nature of the evidence which we want
to go into.14
The trial court denied the admission of evidence of the victims' prior sexual
conduct.
Although the trial court denied admission of the evidence the defendant sought
to introduce, it permitted the defendant to testify at trial about his version of the
story. He testified that each of the sexual encounters was an act of prostitution and
that the "women reacted negatively" when he refused to pay them.' 5 The jury
convicted the defendant of false imprisonment and two counts each of aggravated
assault and second-degree criminal penetration. The defendant appealed, arguing
that the trial court improperly denied the admission of evidence of the victims' prior
did not actually use the words
sexual conduct. Although the defense counsel
"motive to lie" during the in camera hearing,' 6 the court of appeals, nevertheless,
believed that the defense counsel's arguments "that the participants had a difference
of opinion as to remuneration for sexual services performed pursuant to their
'contract' were adequate to alert the trial court to the basis for Defendant's
proffer."' 17 Thus, the court of appeals held that the evidence that the victims were
prostitutes was admissible for the purpose of showing a possible motive to
fabricate. 8 Furthermore, the court of appeals found that the exclusion of such
evidence was a violation to the defendant's constitutional right to confront the

11. Johnson, 123 N.M. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879.
12. Id. at 643, 944 P.2d at 872.
13. During the in camerahearing, the court heard testimony from the detective who had investigated the
case and interviewed the alleged victims. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 643, 944 P.2d at 872. The detective testified
that one of the victims, T.A., told him that she was not working as a prostitute when she got into the car with the
defendant, although she had engaged in prostitution on occasion in the past. See id. The detective also testified that
the defendant told him that T.A. had not been working as a prostitute that night. See id.
14. Id. at 651,944 P.2d at 880.
15. See State v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 77, 82, 908 P.2d 770,775 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 123 N.M. 640,944
P.2d 869 (1997).
16. See id. at 81, 908 P.2d at 774.
17. Id. at 80, 908 P.2d at 773.
18. See id. at 81, 908 P.2d at 774.
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witnesses against him.' 9 Therefore, the appeals court reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial.20
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 and reversed the court of
appeals. After a review of the trial court's in camera hearing, the supreme court
disagreed with the court of appeals' analysis of the defendant's arguments. The
supreme court found that the defendant "never expressed his intention to use the
prior sexual conduct evidence to expose the victims' motives to lie or as a basis for
a theory of relevance other than propensity."2 2 In fact, the court found that the
defendant did not show how such evidence would be relevant to anything other than
propensity. Therefore, the court held that evidence of prior sexual conduct is
inadmissible in this case because the defendant "failed to show (a) that the evidence
was material and relevant, and (b) that its probative value equaled or outweighed
its inflammatory or prejudicial nature."23
II.BACKGROUND
A. The Need for Rape Law Reform
Prior to rape shield legislation, many courts considered a complainant's sexual
24
history relevant to whether the victim consented on the occasion in question. The
traditional rules were based on the faulty presumption that a woman with a
character of unchastity or promiscuity was more likely to consent on any particular
'26
occasion. 25 One commentator described this as the "yes/yes inference., That is, a
woman who consented to nonmarital sex on some occasions was more likely to
consent on all occasions.27 Courts also considered prior sexual conduct relevant to
impeach a victim's credibility on the premise that an unchaste woman has a
tendency to be untruthful.28
Under these common law rules, defense lawyers "were permitted great latitude
in bringing out intimate details about a victim's life.., even though that conduct
may have at best a tenuous connection to the offense for which the defendant is
being tried. 29 Such intrusions into a victim's private life, described by one
'
commentator as "nothing less than character-assassination in open court," resulted
the legal
by
in embarrassment and harassment of the rape victim. This hostility

19. See id.
20. See id. at 82, 908 P.2d at 775.
21. See State v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009 (1995).
22. State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 651. 944 P.2d 869, 880 (1997).
23. Id. at 642, 944 P.2d at 871.
24. See Clifford S.Fishman, Consent, Credibility, andthe Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense
Complainant'sPast Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH.U. L REV. 709, 715 (1995); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape
Victims in the State and FederalCourts: A Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 783-84
(1986).
25. See Fishman, supra note 24, at 715.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. 124 CONG. REC. H34,912 (daily ed. October 10, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).
30. Galvin, supranote 24, at 794.
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system had a significant impact on deterring reports of rape.3" Consequently, rape
law reform has attempted to address the problems of underreporting and protecting
the complainant from harassment by restricting the use of the complainant's sexual
history.32
Although rape shield laws differ from state to state,33 their primary purpose is to
reverse the common law presumption discussed above, thereby denying the
admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct aimed solely at the victim's unchaste
character. Rape shield legislation generally falls into four categories based on the
methods by which they restrict the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual
conduct: (1) the Michigan approach; (2) the federal approach; (3) the New Mexico
approach; and (4) the California approach. 4 Each approach has been criticized as
having inherent problems.35
The Michigan approach is considered the most restrictive of the four categories.36
It prohibits the admissibility of all evidence of prior sexual conduct, unless such
evidence falls within specific enumerated exceptions.37 The specific exceptions vary
somewhat from state to state.38 The most common exception is evidence of the
complainant's sexual conduct with the defendant and with third persons only when
offered to show that the third person, and not the defendant, may have been the
source of semen, physical injury, or pregnancy.39 Under this approach, judicial
discretion is limited because the legislature has predetermined which evidence of
prior sexual conduct will be admissible. 4
Twenty-three states follow the Michigan approach. 4t The Michigan approach has
been criticized as being too restrictive because the specific exceptions do not
31. See id. at 796. Other factors contributing to the underreporting of rape include fear of retaliation and
protection of family members. See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Women's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom,77 COLUM. L REV. 1, 24 (1977).
32. See Galvin, supra note 24, at 797-98.
33. 48 states have adopted rape shield legislation. See Shawn J. Wallach, Rape Shield Laws: Protectingthe
Victim at the Expense of the Defendant's ConstitutionalRights, 13 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 485, 486 n.7 (1997).
Arizona and Utah, which have no rape shield statutes, appear to recognize a common law rule that is similar to rape
shield legislation which restricts evidence of prior sexual conduct. See id.
34. See Galvin, supra note 24, at 773; Wallach, supra note 33, at 490-98.
35. See Galvin, supra note 24, at 812.
36. See id. at 773. The Michigan rape shield statute states:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be
admitted.., unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed
evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature
does not outweigh its probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen,
pregnancy, or disease.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991).
37. See Galvin, supra note 24, at 773. In fact, some statutes have been amended, or declared
unconstitutional in response to certain factual settings. See id. at 773-74.
38. See Wallach, supra note 33, at 491-92 (discussing the various exceptions that certain states have
adopted).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 490.
41. These jurisdictions include: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See id. at 521 n.27.
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42
anticipate the full range of factual settings. Certain evidence of prior sexual
conduct may be highly relevant and outweigh any prejudicial effect, yet not fall
within an exception and thus be inadmissible.
3
The federal approach is somewhat less restrictive than the Michigan approach.
It provides for specific exceptions to the prohibition of admission of evidence of
sexual conduct, and then has a "catch all" exception which allows evidence that if
excluded would violate a defendant's constitutional rights," or is "relevant and
admissible in the interest of justice."4 5 The criticism of this approach is that the
"catch all" exception gives judges the same amount of discretion as the broad New
6
Mexico style approach and thus undermines the exceptions.1 Furthermore, the soexclusion of
called "catch-all" provision lacks guidelines for determining when
47
rights.
constitutional
defendant's
a
certain evidence will violate
The approach Zaken by the New Mexico legislature is the least restrictive
approach." Under this approach, judges are given broad discretion to determine the
admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence after an in camera pretrial hearing,
in which the defendant offers proof of the relevance of the prior conduct evidence
he is seeking to admit.49 Unlike the restrictive Michigan approach, there are no
enumerated exceptions under the broad New Mexico approach. The determinative
factor is whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect.5" This approach has been criticized as over-inclusive because it gives trial

42. See Galvin, supra note 24, at 773-74.
43. Jurisdictions following the federal approach include: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, New
Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas and the U.S. Military. See Wallach, supra note 33, at 521 n.59.
44. See FED. R. EviD. 412. The rule provides that evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct or alleged
predisposition is generally inadmissible subject to the following exceptions:
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible under these
rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove
that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the
person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the
prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.
Id.
45. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (following the federal approach).
46. See Wallach, supra note 33, at 496.
47. See id. at 512; Galvin, supra note 24, at 893.
48. See Wallach, supra note 33, at 493 n.50 (referring to this approach as the New Jersey approach). N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994), provides in pertinent part:
As a matter of substantive right,... evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct, opinion
evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct or of reputation for past sexual conduct, shall not
be admitted unless and only to the extent that the court finds that, the evidence is material to the
case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.
Id.
Other jurisdictions following the New Mexico approach include: Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wyoming. See Wallach, supra note 33, at 493 n.50.
49. See N.M. R. EVID. Rule 11-413(B). The rule provides in pertinent part: "If such evidence is proposed
to be offered, the defendant must file a written motion prior to trial. The court shall hear such pretrial motion prior
to trial at an in camera hearing to determine whether such evidence is admissible ...." Id.
50. See Galvin, supranote 24, at 774. Galvin refers to this approach as the Texas approach, but Texas has
since amended its statute. See Wallach, supra note 33, at 521 n.50. For purposes of this Note, this approach is
referred to as the "New Mexico approach."
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courts an "unfettered exercise of discretion" without providing the courts with
guidance in determining the probative value of prior sexual conduct evidence."1
The California approach uses a structured and rather unique method that divides
prior conduct evidence into two categories: 1) evidence offered to prove consent;
or 2) evidence offered to prove credibility. 2 Evidence falling within each category
is generally prohibited, subject to some exceptions.5 3 The line between conduct and
credibility evidence is not distinct and presents a problem in this approach because
evidence that establishes consent would impeach a victim's credibility, and
evidence used to attack a victim's credibility may raise the likelihood of consent. 4
B. The Constitutionalityof Rape Shield Laws
Although rape shield laws address strong policy interests in protecting rape
victims, there are times when rape shield laws may compromise the defendant's
right to a fair trial. The accused in a criminal trial has a fundamental constitutional
right to due process; "the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations. 5 5 Essential to due process is the right to call witnesses on one's own
behalf and to confront adverse witnesses. 6 However, a defendant's right to present
evidence is not absolute or without limitation. The defendant does not have a right
to present evidence that is irrelevant or outweighed by prejudicial effect.5 1
Furthermore, "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause
is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on
concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 58
Rape shield laws have been challenged on constitutional grounds because of the
restrictions placed on the defendant's use of evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct. 9 The four different approaches of rape shield statutes discussed above
present unique constitutional issues depending on the methods by which they
restrict prior conduct evidence.' However, it is significant to note that no rape
shield statute has been found unconstitutional on its face, although there have been
cases where courts have held such statutes unconstitutional as applied to the
particular facts of the case. 6'
51. See Galvin, supra note 24 at 883.
52. See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West 1995). Jurisdictions following the California approach
include: Delaware, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Washington. See Wallach, supra note 33,
at 521 n.67.
53. See Galvin, supra note 24, at 775.
54. See id. at 775-76.
55. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
56. See id.
57. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325, 330
(1990). "It is beyond dispute that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to present irrelevant, prejudicial
evidence in his or her behalf." Galvin, supra note 24, at 806.
58. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.
59. See Joel E. Smith, Annotation: Constitutionality of "Rape Shield" Statute Restricting Use of Evidence
of Victim's Sexual Experience, 1 A.LR.4th 283 (1981).
60. See Wallach, supra note 33, at 497-514 (discussing constitutional challenges to each of the four
different approaches).
61. See id at 498. For example, in Michiganv. Lucas, the Supreme Court noted that a legitimate interest
may restrict a defendant's right to present relevant testimony as long as such a restriction is neither arbitrary nor
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Although the current rape shield laws are likely to be constitutional on their face,
the more difficult issue is determining the circumstances under which a state's
legitimate interests must yield to a defendant's constitutional rights. In other words,
when would prior sexual conduct evidence be sufficiently relevant and critical to
a defense, such that it would violate a defendant's constitutional rights if excluded?
There are two commonly recognized instances when prior conduct evidence is
considered highly relevant:62 (1) when the prior sexual conduct is between the
defendant and the victim; 63 and (2) when the prior conduct evidence is offered to
prove that a person other than the defendant was the Source of semen, injury or
other physical evidence.' Sexual conduct evidence that falls within either of these
value and less
two circumstances is considered to have "far higher probative
65
prejudicial effect than evidence of a general lack of chastity.
Evidence of prior sexual conduct may also be sufficiently relevant if it shows
bias or motive to fabricate.' The Supreme Court has established that "cross
examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives of the witness as they may relate directly to'67issues or personalities in the
case at hand.., is a constitutionally protected right. In fact, some states include
bias as an enumerated exception to the general inadmissibility of prior sexual
conduct evidence.68
V. RATIONALE
The Johnson court found that evidence that the victims were prostitutes was not
69
relevant to the defendant's theory of defense. In reaching this conclusion, the court
considered the policies behind the enactment of rape shield legislation and the
constitutional limits on accomplishing those policies in order to determine the
v.
disproportionate to its designed purpose. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149, 151 (1991) (citing Rock
restrictive
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). The Court held that Michigan's rape shield statute, which follows the
enumerated approach, served a legitimate interest of protecting rape victims from "surprise harassment and
unnecessary invasions of privacy." See id. at 149-50. In Lucas, the defendant failed to follow the statutory
procedure of providing written notice within ten days of an intent to present evidence of a victim's prior sexual
conduct under a statutory exception. See id. at 147. The Court found that the notice and hearing requirement was
not unconstitutional per se and remanded the case for a determination of whether the statute was constitutional
under the circumstances. See id at 153.
62. See Galvin, supra note 24, at 807.
63. See, e.g., FED.R. EvlD.412 (b)(1)(B) (excepting from general inadmissibility "evidence of specific
instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct
offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution...').
64. See, e.g., FED.R. EVID.412 (b)(1)(A) (excepting from general inadmissibility "evidence of specific
instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the
source of semen, injury or other physical evidence..
65. Galvin, supra note 24, at 807.
66. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,316 (1974); see also, Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988)
(holding that preventing a criminal defendant from questioning a witness to show bias violates the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation). The Tenth circuit has also recognized motive to fabricate as a proper subject
for examination although the defendant was unable to introduce the victim's motive to fabricate for the first time
on appeal. See United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1981).
67. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a state's policy interest in protecting the
confidentiality of a juvenile offender's must yield to the defendant's vital constitutional right of cross examination
to show bias. See id. at 320.
68. See, e.g., OR. R. EviD. 412(2)(b)(A); TEX.R. CRiM.EviD. 412(b)(2)(C).
69. See State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640,651,944 P.2d 869, 880 (1997).
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relevance of the evidence that the victims had acted as prostitutes on prior
occasions.
In Johnson, the defendant's theory of defense was that each sexual encounter was
a consensual act of prostitution.7' The supreme court rejected the court of appeals'
reasoning that the defendant's proffer went beyond a theory of consent "to the issue
of whether the victims had reason to fabricate the rape to avenge Defendant's
failure or refusal to pay them."'" In doing so, the court put much emphasis on the
fact that the defendant never actually used the words "motive to lie" during the incamera pretrial hearing.72
In its interpretation of the defendant's theory of defense, the Johnson court
considered whether evidence of prostitution would be relevant to such a theory. The
court interpreted the New Mexico rape shield law as "emphasiz[ing] the general
irrelevance of a victim's sexual history," and not as an attempt "to remove relevant
evidence from the jury's consideration."73 Furthermore, evidence of prostitution is
highly prejudicial.74 For example, a jury could easily pass moral judgment on the
victim without considering the facts at issue. The Johnson court explained that
"prejudice" does not refer merely to a prejudicial impact on the rape victim.75
Rather, it refers to a factf'mder's interpretation of the evidence; that is, "whether the
introduction of the victim's past sexual conduct may confuse the issues, mislead the
jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an improper or emotional basis. 76
Prior acts of prostitution may show a propensity to engage in sex for pay.
However, the Johnson court found that such evidence falls short of showing that the
victims had a motive to falsely accuse the defendant of rape because he refused to
pay for the act.77 In addition, the court criticized the dicta in State v. Romero" that
indicated that evidence of prior acts of prostitution would be relevant when the
defendant claimed the sexual encounter was itself an act of prostitution.7 9 This is
because the defendant's guilt or innocence should be determined based on the facts
of the particular encounter at issue, not on the victim's propensity or acts in
conformity with prior conduct.80 Thus, the court found that evidence of prior acts
of prostitution was not relevant to the defendant's theory of defense."
The court in Johnson acknowledged that there are times when prior sexual
conduct evidence could be relevant and its exclusion could implicate a defendant's

70. See id. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879.
71. Id. at 872.
72. See text accompanying supra notes 16-17.
73. Johnson, 123 N.M. at 647,944 P.2d at 876 (quoting State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995)).
74. See State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 26, 606 P.2d 1116, 1120(1980).
75. See Fishman, supra note 24, at 725.
76. Johnson, 123 N.M. at 648, 944 P.2d at 877.
77. See id. at 651, 944 P.2d at 880.
78. 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980), overruled by State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d
869 (1997).
79. See Romero, 94 N.M. at 26, 606 P.2d at 1120.
80. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879. The court cites Rule 11-404(B) of the New Mexico
Rules Annotated that makes evidence of other crimes inadmissible "to show action in conformity" although it could
be used for other purposes such as showing a motive or intent. See id. (quoting N.M. R. EVID. 11-404(B)).
81. Seeid. at 651, 944 P.2d at 880.
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constitutional right of confrontation.8 2 The court properly noted that a "motive to
lie" is a theory of relevance that would implicate a defendant's right of
confrontation.83 Yet, in this case, evidence that the victims had acted as prostitutes
on prior occasions with third parties did not have a tendency to show that either
victim had a motive to fabricate rape charges against the present defendant.84
The Johnson court adopted the view held in other jurisdictions that there must
be a direct link between the victim's past sexual conduct and her alleged motive to
fabricate in order for prior sexual conduct evidence to be admitted under a motive
to fabricate theory. 5 The defendant must "specify the issue or issues the evidence
is intended to address and demonstrate how the evidence is truly probative on those
6
issues exclusive of the . . . 'yes/yes inference"' prohibited by rape shield laws.
This may be accomplished by showing a pattern of behavior comparable to the
defendant's theory of defense. For example, the defendant may show that the victim
has, on previous occasions, made false accusations of rape in order to extort
money.87 However, evidence that the victims had previously acted as prostitutes
would not tend to show that either victim "would retaliate against those who failed
to pay her by fabricating false charges."8 8
V. ANALYSIS
Prior to Johnson, New Mexico courts had no established guidelines for
conducting the rape shield statute's balancing test. Thus, the New Mexico
legislative formulation of the statute was subject to the criticism as being
overinclusive and giving trial courts "nearly unfettered discretion,"8 9 without
providing the courts with guidelines in determining the probative value of prior
sexual conduct evidence."°
The New Mexico rape shield statute and corresponding rule of evidence,
prohibits the introduction of evidence of prior sexual conduct "unless, and only to
the extent that the court finds that, the evidence is material to the case and that its

82. See id. at 649, 944 P.2d at 878.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 651, 944 P.2d at 880.
85. See id. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879. The Johnson court cited examples of similar rulings in other
jurisdictions: Washington v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 523-24 (Wash. 1983) (holding that evidence of general
promiscuity is inadmissible because there was no evidence of conduct comparable to defense theory) and Winfield
v. Virginia,301 S.E.2d 15, 21 (Va. 1983) (holding that evidence of the victim's efforts to extort money from others
by threats was sufficiently similar to the theory of defense and thus admissible under a motive to fabricate theory,
while general reputation evidence of the victim's unchaste character is not admissible). See Johnson, 123 N.M.
at 650, 944 P.2d at 879.
86. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879 (quoting Fishman, supra note 24, at 725). See also
People v. Williams, 330 N.W.2d 823, 829-31 (Mich. 1982); Minnesota v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 866, 869
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Winfield v. Virginia, 301 S.E.2d 15, 21 (Va. 1983); Washington v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514,
523-24 (Wash. 1983); Wisconsin v. Hemdon, 426 N.W.2d 347, 355 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
87. See Winfield, 301 S.E.2d at 21.
88. State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 651, 944 P.2d, 869, 880 (1997).
89. Id. at 647, 944 P.2d at 876.
90. See supra Part III for a discussion of the category into which the New Mexico statute falls. For further
discussion concerning the criticism of the New Mexico type formulation of a rape shield statute, see Galvin, supra
note 24, at 876.
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inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value."'" This
language appears to grant trial courts wide discretion in determining the
admissibility of a victim's past sexual conduct. However, Johnson rejected the
characterization that trial courts have "nearly unfettered discretion" and went on to
establish guidelines for the trial courts that are lacking in the statute itself.92 First,
the court emphasized the general irrelevance of evidence of prior sexual conduct.93
Second, the court provided a test for determining when prior sexual conduct
evidence is of such relevance that its exclusion may infringe on a defendant's
constitutional rights.94 Third, Johnson emphasized the specificity with which a
defendant must define his theory of defense when seeking to introduce evidence of
prior sexual conduct under the rape shield statute. 95
A. Relevance of a Rape Victim's PriorSexual Conduct
Although New Mexico courts have recognized the general irrelevance of a
victim's prior sexual history, 96 the New Mexico Supreme Court in Johnson limited
the extent to which a victim's prior sexual conduct with third parties is relevant. 97
Prior sexual conduct is now deemed irrelevant to the issue of consent on future
occasions, even if that conduct involves prostitution because the prior conduct with
third parties usually does not implicate the present defendant in any manner.98 In
addition, Johnson criticized dicta in State v. Romero' that evidence of prior acts of
prostitution may be relevant to the issue of consent when the defendant alleges that
the conduct at issue was an act of prostitution.'10
In Romero, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the victim had
engaged in prostitution prior to the incident with the defendant. Citing the policy
behind the enactment of rape shield legislation, Romero found that evidence of prior
acts of prostitution was not relevant to the issue of consent because the defendant
did not claim that the incident in question was an act of prostitution.0 1 However,
the court in Romero did suggest that "[s]uch information might be relevant if it were
contended that the intercourse with the defendant was itself an act of prostitution . "..."102
Evidence of a victim's prior acts of prostitution may be the only evidence a
defendant could offer to corroborate his theory of defense, or that the alleged rape
91. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994). See also N.M. R. EVID. Rule 11413.
92. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 647, 944 P.2d at 876, referring to Professor Galvin's characterization of
statutes that follow the broad approach. See also Galvin, supra note, 23 at 774.
93. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 647, 944 P.2d at 876.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 651, 944 P.2d at 880.
96. See State v. Fish, 101 N.M. 329,333,681 P.2d 1106, 1110 (1984) (stating that "[pirior sexual activity
of the victim does not of itself bear on the victim's consent") (citing State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 26, 606 P.2d
1116, 1120 (Ct. App. 1980); State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 15-16, 582 P.2d 384, 392-93 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978)).
97. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879.
98. See id.
99. 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980), overruled by State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d
869 (1997).
100. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879.
101. See Romero, 94 N.M. at 26,606 P.2d at 1120.
102. Id.
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was consensual sex for pay.' 3 Under such circumstances, evidence of the victim's
prior acts of prostitution would seem to be relevant to the defendant's credibility,
and it would also cast doubt on the victim's credibility."°4 However, Johnson found
that evidence that the victim was a prostitute would not be relevant even if a
defendant argued that the intercourse on the occasion at issue was an act of
prostitution. While prostitution may show a pattern of consensual sexual conduct,
evidence of prior acts of prostitution is irrelevant to consent unless the
circumstances surrounding the alleged sexual assault are similar to the
prostitution.0 5 Otherwise, such evidence would tend to establish consent based on
the common law "yes/yes" inference. 0 6 That is, because the victim acted as a
prostitute on prior occasions, she was likely to have consented to sex on the
occasion in question. Nevertheless, even prostitutes might not consent to sex with
every man on every occasion. It is thus "intolerable to suggest that because the
victim is a prostitute, she automatically is assumed to have consented with anyone
at any time."'0 7 The court in Johnson specified that the evidence must be relevant
beyond the "yes/yes" inference in order to ensure that the defendant's guilt or
innocence is established based on the particular encounter for which the defendant
is charged.' Therefore, evidence of prior sexual conduct with third parties is
generally considered irrelevant to the issue of consent with the present defendant.
Johnson clarified the necessary considerations for determining the prejudicial
impact of evidence of prior sexual conduct. The proper test, according to the court,
is whether the "introduction of the victim's past sexual conduct may confuse the
issues, mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an improper or
emotional basis."'"' 9 Thus, the focus should be on the prejudicial impact to the 0truthfinding process, and not on its potential psychological effect on the victim."
After Johnson, the guidelines for determining relevance and prejudicial impact
now presume that evidence of prior sexual conduct with third parties is generally
irrelevant. This, therefore, narrows the scope of a judge's discretion. Even when
evidence of prior sexual conduct may have some relevance, that relevance will
likely be outweighed by its prejudicial impact to the truth-finding process. In
addition, these guidelines support the policy behind the enactment of the New
Mexico rape shield law. By emphasizing the irrelevance of prior sexual conduct
evidence to the present charges, courts shield the jury from hearing evidence that

103. See State v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 77, 82, 908 P.2d 770,775 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 123 N.M. 640, 944
P.2d 869 (1997). Although the defendant in Johnson was permitted to testify that the encounter was an act of
prostitution, his testimony was inherently suspect. See id.
104. See generally John Gibeaut, Shield a Prosecution Sword, A.B.A. J. 36 (Dec. 1997) (noting that the
debate over rape shield laws raises the question of whether barring sexual conduct evidence would violate a
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation by prohibiting evidence that would cast doubt on the accuser's
credibility).
105. David Huxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: ConstitutionalDespite UnconstitutionalExclusions
of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L REV. 1219, 1237 (1985).
106. See Fishman, supra note 24, at 715.
107. United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 (1992). See
also Williams v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ind. 1997).
108. State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 650, 944 P.2d 869, 879 (1997).
109. Id. at 648, 944 P.2d at 877 (quoting Fishman, supra note 24, at 726).
110. See Fishman, supra note 24, at 726.
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could have a highly prejudicial impact or that could cause the jury to decide a case
on an improper basis. Furthermore, these factors prevent the victim from being put
on trial, and protect the victim from unnecessary harassment and invasions of
privacy. Accordingly, removing some of these obstacles may encourage more
victims to report sex crimes.
B. The Johnson Guidelines Considerthe ConstitutionalLimits of the Rape
Shield Law
Although prior conduct evidence is generally inadmissible to prove consent,
Johnson properly noted that such evidence might be used for other purposes, such
as to prove intent, bias, or motive to fabricate."' As such, Johnson implicitly
adopted and incorporated Rule 412(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence into
the New Mexico rape shield law." 2 Rule 412(b)(1)(C) requires the admission of
"evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant."" 3 Thus, this constitutional limitation provides the outer limit of a trial
court's discretion when applying the balancing test of the New Mexico rape shield
statute.
Johnson also suggested that the trial courts use a five-prong test, referred to as
the Herndon test," 4 to determine when a defendant's right of confrontation is
implicated." 5 Under the Herndon test, evidence of prior sexual conduct is admitted
only if:
(1) there is a clear showing that the complainant committed the prior acts;
(2) the circumstances of the prior acts closely resemble those of the present
case;
(3) the prior act is clearly relevant to a material issue, such as identity, intent, or
bias;
(4) the evidence is necessary to the prosecution's case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." 6
The purpose of the Herndon test is to determine whether the prior sexual acts are
clearly similar to the conduct at issue to establish its relevance, exclusive of the
prohibited "yes/yes" inference." 7 This framework serves to effectuate the rape
shield's policy of eliminating character evidence while recognizing the
constitutional limitations of achieving those objectives when the evidence is used

11. See id. at 647, 649, 944 P.2d at 876, 878.
112. See id. at 648, 944 P.2d at 877. The Johnson court stated that "[wle conclude that Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, which specifically provides that evidence is admissible if its exclusion would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant, states expressly what our rule must be construed to require implicitly." Id.
(emphasis added).
113. FED.R.EviD.412.
114. See State v. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d 347 (Vis. Ct. App. 1988), overruled by State v. Pulizzano, 456
N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1990). Pulizanooverruled Herndon only to the extent that Herndon declared the Wisconsin rape
shield statute unconstitutional on its face. See Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 330.
115. See Johnson, 123 N.M. at 649,944 P.2d at 878. See also Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 335; Herndon, 426
N.W.2d at 360.
116. See Hemdon, 426 N.W.2d at 360.
117. See Abraham P. Ordover, Admissibility of Patternsof SimilarSexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death
of Characterfor Chastity, 63 CoRNELL L. REV. 90, 94 (1977). See also Herndon, 426 N.W.2d at 360.
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to show intent, bias, or motive. The first element of the Herndon test excludes
general reputation evidence by requiring a clear showing that the complainant
engaged in the prior sexual conduct."' The second and third elements exclude any
confusing and prejudicial evidence while permitting evidence that shows a clearly
similar pattern, or modus operandi." 9 The fourth element requires the court to
consider the "merits of the consent defense itself' to determine if the prior conduct
evidence is critical to that defense. 2 This element would also aid in eliminating
fraudulent claims under the intent, bias, or motive theories.12 ' Finally, the fifth
element requires the evidence to be truly probative and eliminate questioning
designed to harass the victim or arouse the jury's sentiments against her.122
Johnson noted that the Herndon test is only a framework for the trial court's
exercise of discretion.2 2 The guidelines provide a method for determining when the
exclusion of evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct would infringe on a
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. A general claim that the evidence
will show bias, intent, or motive to fabricate is not sufficient. 24 The court must
identify how the evidence supports the defendant's theory of defense beyond the
mere allegations of the victim's general unchastity. Thus, Johnson narrows the
scope of a judge's discretion by defining the constitutional limits of that discretion.
C. Identifying the Defendant's Theory of Defense
Johnson reflects the rationale behind the enactment of rape shield legislation.
However, the court may have put too much significance in the defendant's failure
to use the words "motive to lie" when identifying the defendant's theory of defense.
For a defendant facing possible jail time and the stigma of a rape conviction,
fairness would seem to require more leniency when interpreting a defendant's
theory of defense. Even if the court in Johnson had accepted the defendant's theory
of defense that the victims had a motive to lie, it likely would have reached the same
conclusion. After all, the court held that prior acts of prostitution alone are not a
sufficient showing of a motive to fabricate.1 25 Therefore, the court's emphasis on
the specific "motive to lie" language in identifying a theory of defense narrows the
trial judge's discretion in interpreting a defendant's arguments during an in camera
hearing. Furthermore, it requires that a defendant be very precise when seeking to
introduce evidence under the rape shield statute.

118. See Ordover, supra note 117, at 113-14.
119. See id. at 114.
120. See id.
121. See id. For example, in cases where it is clearly demonstrated that the defendant used "overwhelming
force" against the victim, prior conduct evidence would be excluded. See id. at 114, n.136.
122. See id. at 114.
123. See State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 649, 944 P.2d 869, 878 (1997).
124. See id. at 650, 944 P.2d at 879.
125. See id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

VI. IMPLICATIONS
As Johnson demonstrates, the New Mexico rape shield law balancing test is not
as straight forward to apply as the typical Rule 403126 balancing test, especially
when considering the constitutional issues it raises as applied to certain factual
settings. The Johnson decision is significant because it will aid judges in
determining the admissibility of prior sexual conduct, help to prevent arbitrary
decisions, and ensure that the rape shield statute serves the purposes it was designed
to serve. First, the guidelines articulated in Johnson emphasize the general
irrelevance of prior sexual conduct evidence. Second, they protect the victim from
undue harassment, which in turn promotes effective reporting. Third, the guidelines
help to prevent a jury from being misled or confused by collateral issues and
deciding a case on an improper basis. Fourth, the guidelines lay out an effective
framework for determining when the rape shield law will infringe upon a
defendant's constitutional right to introduce evidence that might otherwise be
inadmissible under the New Mexico statute. Finally, Johnson emphasizes the
importance of clearly stating a theory of defense when a defendant in a rape
prosecution seeks to introduce evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Johnson decision emphasizes that a victim's prior sexual conduct with third
parties is generally inadmissible under the New Mexico rape shield statute, even
when it includes evidence that a victim had previously acted as a prostitute. This is
because such evidence is considered irrelevant or is outweighed by its highly
prejudicial impact on the truth-finding process. A defendant does not have a
constitutional right to introduce evidence that is irrelevant. On the other hand, if a
defendant can establish that the evidence is clearly relevant to the victim's intent,
bias, or motive to fabricate, the defendant may have a constitutional right to
introduce that evidence. However, the defendant must be able to prove that the
evidence would be relevant beyond establishing consent based on the victim's
general unchastity. Moreover, the defendant must clearly state his theory of defense
beyond consent. Once a trial court knows the relevance of particular evidence, it can
properly determine the probative value of that evidence and weigh it against the
prejudicial effect as proscribed by the New Mexico rape shield statute.
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